知識

Knowledge — Grokipedia Fact-checked by Grok 1 month ago Knowledge Ara Eve Leo Sal 1x Knowledge is the cognitive relation a subject bears to a proposition when the subject believes the proposition , the proposition is true, and the belief is justified, though this tripartite analysis has faced significant challenges. [1] Originating in ancient philosophy , particularly Plato's exploration in works like the Theaetetus , the concept centers on distinguishing reliable cognition from mere true opinion or unfounded belief . Epistemology examines the sources of knowledge—such as sensory perception , rational inference , memory , and testimony —and debates whether justification requires infallible foundations or arises from coherent belief networks or reliable processes attuned to causal structures. [2] Edmund Gettier's 1963 counterexamples revealed cases of justified true belief undermined by luck, prompting alternatives like reliabilism , which prioritizes beliefs produced by truth-conducive mechanisms over internalist justification. [1] Knowledge manifests in forms including propositional ("knowing that"), procedural ("knowing how"), and by acquaintance, with empirical studies underscoring its adaptive value in predicting environmental contingencies. Ongoing controversies highlight the absence of consensus, as theories like foundationalism , positing self-justifying basic beliefs , compete with coherentism's holistic mutual support, reflecting tensions between evidential standards and real-world belief acquisition. [3] Core Concepts Definitions of Knowledge The English term "knowledge" originates from the Middle English "knowleche" or "knaweleche," derived from the verb "knowen" meaning "to know" combined with an element akin to "-leche," related to acknowledgment or recognition, tracing back to Old English "cnāwan" signifying "to recognize" or "to perceive." [4] This etymology emphasizes an active process of cognition or acquaintance with facts or objects. [5] In ordinary usage, knowledge denotes information, facts, skills, or awareness acquired through experience, learning, or education, often distinguished from mere opinion by its basis in evidence or reliability. [6] For instance, knowing how to ride a bicycle involves procedural competence rather than abstract proposition, while knowing that the Earth orbits the Sun requires factual correspondence to observable reality. [7] Philosophically, the dominant traditional analysis defines knowledge as justified true belief (JTB), a formulation attributed to Plato in his dialogue Theaetetus , where he proposes that knowledge is true belief accompanied by an account or justification, distinguishing it from mere true opinion that could arise by luck. [7] Under JTB, a subject S knows a proposition p if: (1) p is true, (2) S believes p, and (3) S is justified in believing p. [8] This tripartite structure prevailed in Western epistemology for over two millennia until Edmund Gettier's 1963 paper presented counterexamples—cases of justified true beliefs that intuitively fail to constitute knowledge due to epistemic luck, such as beliefs true by coincidence rather than reliable cognitive processes. [1] Post-Gettier reforms have proposed alternatives, including the requirement that justification track truth (no false lemmas in the justification chain) or that knowledge entails belief produced by a reliable belief-forming mechanism, as in reliabilist theories. [8] Some epistemologists defend refined versions of JTB, arguing that proper fourth conditions—such as defeatability or causal connection to the fact—resolve Gettier cases without abandoning the core analysis. [8] These debates highlight that no consensus definition exists, with knowledge often characterized minimally as a species of cognitive success involving accurate representation of reality , but varying accounts prioritize factors like internalist justification versus externalist reliability. [7] Empirical studies in cognitive science , such as folk epistemology surveys, indicate that lay intuitions align more closely with JTB augmented by anti-luck conditions than pure reliabilism . [9] Traditional Analysis: Justified True Belief The traditional analysis of knowledge holds that a subject S knows a proposition p if and only if p is true, S believes p , and S is justified in believing p . This tripartite structure, known as justified true belief (JTB), dominated epistemological thought for centuries, providing a framework to distinguish knowledge from mere opinion or accident . [10] The conditions are individually necessary and jointly sufficient, meaning the absence of any one precludes knowledge, while their conjunction establishes it. [11] Plato first articulated a version of this analysis in his dialogue Theaetetus , composed around 369 BCE, where Socrates proposes that knowledge is "true belief with an account" ( logos ), interpreted as requiring justification beyond mere truth and belief to ensure reliability. [12] In the text, at sections 201c-d, Plato distinguishes knowledge from true judgments lacking rational explanation, emphasizing that justification elevates belief to knowledge by connecting it causally to the facts via reason. [7] This formulation addressed earlier Socratic concerns with unstable opinions, as seen in the Meno , where true belief without fixation (justification) is deemed unstable and insufficient for genuine understanding. The truth condition stipulates that for S to know p , p must correspond to reality ; false beliefs, even if sincerely held and justified, cannot constitute knowledge, as they fail to track actual states of affairs. [10] The belief condition requires that S actually hold p in mind as accepted, excluding cases where S lacks conviction, such as unwitting truths or denials of evident facts. [11] Justification demands that S 's belief be supported by sufficient evidence or reasoning, typically evidentialist in nature, where the grounds causally explain the belief's reliability rather than mere psychological comfort. [7] Proponents argued this prevents lucky guesses, as in scenarios where a subject correctly identifies a distant figure as a sheep due to misleading evidence that coincidentally aligns with truth, lacking proper justificatory linkage. [10] This analysis influenced Western philosophy from antiquity through the early 20th century , underpinning accounts in thinkers like Descartes, who sought indubitable justification via clear and distinct perceptions, and Locke, who emphasized empirical evidence as the basis for justified beliefs about the external world. [7] By formalizing knowledge as JTB, it enabled rigorous analysis of epistemic norms, prioritizing causal connections between belief-forming processes and truth over subjective confidence alone. [12] Modern Challenges and Reforms In 1963, Edmund Gettier published "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?", presenting counterexamples that undermine the sufficiency of justified true belief (JTB) for knowledge. [13] These cases involve a subject holding a true belief with apparent justification, yet the belief's truth arises coincidentally through luck or misleading evidence , such as inferring a false lemma that happens to connect to a true conclusion. [13] For instance, if Smith justifiably believes Jones owns a Ford based on evidence , and believes "the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket" due to Jones's situation, but Smith himself gets the job and has ten coins unbeknownst to him, the belief qualifies as JTB without intuitive knowledge. [13] Gettier problems highlight how justification can decouple from truth-tracking, prompting widespread rejection of JTB as an adequate analysis among analytic epistemologists by the late 20th century . [14] One prominent reform is reliabilism , advanced by Alvin Goldman in works from 1976 onward, which defines knowledge as a true belief produced by a reliable belief-forming process— one that yields truth with high probability across counterfactual applications. [15] Process reliabilism avoids Gettier cases by requiring causal reliability rather than internal justification; for example, perceptual beliefs formed by functioning senses count as knowledge if the process reliably tracks environmental facts, irrespective of the subject's reflective access to its reliability. [15] Critics argue it struggles with "swampman" scenarios, where a duplicate entity forms identical true beliefs without a reliable history, or with clairvoyance cases yielding truths sans causal link. [14] Nonetheless, variants like safety-based reliabilism, emphasizing beliefs' resistance to nearby error possibilities, persist in contemporary epistemology . [14] Virtue epistemology, developed by figures like Ernest Sosa since the 1980s, reconceives knowledge in terms of intellectual virtues—reliable dispositions such as careful reasoning or perceptual acuity—such that a true belief manifests the agent's epistemic competence in appropriate conditions. [16] This approach integrates reliabilist elements by viewing virtues as safety-conferring faculties, addressing Gettier luck through demands for "animal knowledge" (first-order reliability) elevated to "reflective knowledge" via higher-order awareness of one's competence. [16] Proponents claim it aligns with intuitive attributions of knowledge , as in expert testimony where skill overrides accidental truth. [16] Detractors note potential over-intellectualization, as everyday knowledge often lacks explicit virtue reflection, and challenges in distinguishing virtues from mere reliable processes. [16] Contextualism offers another response, positing that "knowledge" attributions vary by conversational context, with stricter standards (e.g., ruling out skeptical hypotheses) in philosophical discourse but looser ones in practical settings. [14] Keith DeRose's 1995 framework treats epistemic justification as context-sensitive, allowing JTB to hold in low